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Abstract: In this essay, we introduce the concept of Microjustice as an approach to 
tackle the problem of access to justice for those with limited resources. In addition to 
existing perspectives, we propose to analyze the justice sector as a ‘market’ with its 
corresponding chain of supply and a demand. The challenge is to develop processes 
that are affordable to users with limited resources, whilst making it attractive for the 
providers of justice to act as suppliers. Microjustice allows the demand for justice and 
the  supply  of  justice  to  meet  by  using  tools  of  the  modern  services  economy: 
information technology, economies of scale, cheaper labor at the place of delivery, 
flexible adjustment to local circumstances, self-help and empowerment of the user. 
The analogy to microfinance is instructive. 
We first explore how the market for justice works and why justice does not reach the 
poor. Next, we proceed to the development principles for Microjustice, drawing on 
the work of Prahalad and Hart regarding markets at the “Bottom of the Pyramid.” 
We also show that legal systems are surrounded by knowledge that has an enormous 
potential for innovation, but are not yet open enough to use this potential. We give 
some examples of how Microjustice could look like in practice. Then we investigate 
the  limitations  of  the  market  perspective  and  possible  other  objections  to  the 
Microjustice approach. We conclude by inviting the legal sector service providers, 
NGO’s and other institutions working on access to rights to consider the development 
of innovative services in the spirit of microjustice. Moreover, we urge governments 
and donors to think about access to justice programs in terms of creating a climate 
for innovation and a business climate that stimulates legal service providers to deliver 
their services at the bottom of the pyramid. 
                                                 
1 The Microjustice Initiative is in its early stages of development. It aims to become an international 
platform in which organizations, universities, government institutions, experts and other individuals 
can  participate  to  promote  the  development  of  microjustice.  The  goal  is  to  develop  Microjustice 
processes on the basis of input from field work, to exchange experiences and know how regarding the 
development of innovative justice services, and to gain support for the Microjustice approach (see 
www.microjustice.org).  We  thank  Herman  van  Gunsteren,  Piet  Hein  Donner,  Federico  Mayor 
Zaragoza, Frederik Schutte, José Jaime de Domingo, Jan Michiel Otto, Sam Muller, Annemarie van 
Swinderen, Matthijs Pars, Jin Ho Verdonschot, Toon Bullens, Gonzalo de Cesare and participants in a 
workshop at the Van Vollenhoven Institute for Law, Governance and Development for their valuable 
comments and contributions to the development of the concept of Microjustice.    2 
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I.  REACHING THE CLIENTS 
At the Corte Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Court) in La Paz, hundreds of 
people line up to sort out problems with their birth registrations. Registering your 
newborn child in Bolivia can be a tedious business, with little immediate positive 
consequences. This is one of the reasons why many Bolivians do not exist according 
to  the  Registro  Civil  (Civil  Registry  of  Persons).  When  children  are  due  to  start 
school, they are often required to show a birth certificate in order to enroll.  However, 
if  the  child  has  not  been  registered  at  the  time of  birth,  the  law  requires  a  more 
extensive  procedure  to  obtain  such  registration.  In  addition,  the  bureaucracy  is 
merciless, requiring long court procedures even for the simplest of mistakes, like a 
misspelled name.  In a country with high illiteracy rates among its adult population, 
these types of mistakes are fairly common.. Court cases can easily take years, not to 
mention the costs of lawyers and the time spent in doing additional paperwork. As a 
result, many grown-up Bolivians have no valid birth certificate and, therefore, do not 
exist legally.  
 
In developing countries, millions of people have no effective access to authorities that 
protect their rights. Rule of law and access to justice are essential for basic human 
security. The quality of people’s lives is closely linked to investments in property. 
Their  human  and  social  capital  resides  in  their  key  relationships  (employment, 
business, family, community, etc). Protection of this capital through processes that 
protect property rights, and that solve disputes in these key-relationships, is a key 
element  of  any  strategy  to  stimulate  human  development  and  economic  growth. 
However, the existing paths to justice are too expensive, too time-consuming, or too 
cumbersome. At the supply side of the justice system, police, lawyers, courts, and 
officials are often inadequately funded. Even when there are funds, these ‘suppliers of 
justice’ may have little incentives to help the poor. Legal empowerment is such a 
pressing  issue  that  the  United  Nations  has  set  up  a  Commission  for  Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor, hosted by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), and co-chaired by former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and the 
well known Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto.  
 
The situation in developed countries is not always a shining example, because access 
to justice for people with little means can be problematic in similar ways. “Paths to 
Justice” surveys (ABA  1994, Genn &  Beinart  1999, Van Velthoven  & Ter Voert 
2004, Pleasence et al. 2004) typically show that around 45% of the legal problems 
people experience remain unsolved. Although some of those problems go away or 
become less urgent over time, a substantial majority of the interviewed persons report 
that pursuing the issue would cost too much time, effort, and money. Some even point 
at the lack of an effective procedure.     
 
The poor do not only have difficult access to justice, but also to most other services 
and goods (Hammond et al. 2006). They may have to pay an interest rate of as much 
as 400 % to money lenders in order to get credit. The poor in urban areas often pay 
several times more per unit of water than more wealthy inhabitants of the same city. 
They buy oil, soap, and other goods in small quantities for one time use, which makes 
these goods much more expensive than if they had been bought in larger quantities.   4 
Equally, the poor have to spend more money and time than others in case they try to 
access their rights.  
 
When appropriately targeted, however, there is a viable market of many poor who are 
now paying high mark ups on services and goods. The promising approach is the 
recognition that the poor have funds to spend. Although their individual buying power 
is  small,  their  large  numbers  add  up  to  a  huge  market.  However,  first  world 
techniques, products, and delivery systems will have to be adjusted to large markets 
with low budget consumers in order to become profitable. Microcredit, for instance, is 
known by many. Banks providing this microfinance service extend small amounts of 
credit to groups, which monitor each other and advise each other on their business 
ventures.  Physical  collateral  is  usually  replaced  by  a  social  collateral  of  group 
members underwriting each other’s loans. Middlemen take this credit business up to a 
scale that makes it interesting for banks. The business opportunities of the poor are 
such that relatively high interest rates can be paid, but much lower than the poor had 
to pay to money lenders. Banks supply the IT systems and the credit.  
 
Similarly, it may be possible to create justice by combinations of self-help, neutral 
local players, and back-up services provided by companies or government agencies. 
Microjustice  intends  to  use  the  same  underlying  reasoning  as  other  initiatives 
regarding services for people with limited resources. The poor also spend a lot of time 
and money to fulfill their legal needs. That can be a business opportunity. Drawing 
from other examples of profitable products for the poor, C.K. Prahalad and Stuart L. 
Hart have described the principles to use these opportunities in the “The Fortune at 
the  Bottom  of  the  Pyramid”  (Prahalad  &  Hart  2004)  and  their  analysis  has  been 
deepened and expanded by others (Hammond et al. 2006; see for a critical account: 
Karnani). 
 
Imagine a small office with computers with an internet connection, just outside one of 
the Bolivian offices for birth registrations. For a fee of under 0,30 Euro, parents can 
file by themselves, on a state-of-the-art interactive website, all the details needed for 
the registration of their child online. Should they require assistance in filling out the 
form, this is available for a slightly higher fee. Prior to uploading the file, the assistant 
facilitating the process inspects the documents that prove who the parents are and 
keeps  a  copy  of  these.  The  next  business  day,  the  manager  of  the  microjustice 
operation delivers to the registrar all the entries in a format that precisely fits with the 
Registry’s needs. He also pays the fees due by clients minus a 50% discount the 
registry  promises,  because  the  lead-operator  guarantees  the  quality  of  the  files 
submitted and delivers the information in a format that fits the needs of the Registry. 
In troublesome or problematic instances, both parties will sort these out and the lead 
operator will record this in a laptop. Should there be a need for court interventions, 
the lead operator can print the necessary documents, when back at the office, and have 
them filed the next morning.  
 
Both  the  microjustice  firm  and  the  registrar  know  that  the  information  filed  is 
accessible via the internet, by the parents or any person they authorize by providing 
their access password. They also know that by cooperating with each other, they can 
make their work easier.  The ‘profits’ of that effort, will at the end, be shared between 
them. Part of their understanding is that they both have a reputation to care for.  The 
lead  operator  acts  as  a  watchdog  of  the  Registry,  carefully  monitoring  the   5 
trustworthiness,  the  client-friendliness,  the  speed  and  other  quality  indicators  for 
every Registry s/he works with. As this microjustice firm, there are others performing 
similar work throughout the region.  They also publish performance indicators on 
their website, providing an impartial and transparent overview of the performance of 
the several registries. The registry has a similar role in monitoring the quality of the 
work  of  registration  service  companies  such  as  this  one  and  publishing  quality 
indicators on such businesses on their national websites. 
 
Most importantly, the whole supply chain of registrations is involved in an ongoing 
process  of  improving  its  procedures.  The  major  contribution  of  the  central 
government  to  this  has  not  been  a  subsidy,  but  an  adjustment  of  incentives.  The 
people working in courts, registries, and services companies can now all earn more 
money or make their lives easier, if they deliver better services to the public. The 
court, for instance, is not only paid a  fee for each case, but the  government also 
pledges a cash incentive for solving recurring issues through a precedent that sets out 
general guidelines for solving these issues. Any partner in the supply chain sets its 
own fees. For instance, some categories of clients can be charged more if they require 
additional or special services.  This can be done as long as they remain transparent in 
their operations. Competition and pressure from within the supply chain keeps fees 
naturally  in  check.  At  the  Registries,  they  have  to  maintain  and  ever  increase 
efficiency and efficacy levels, as central governments can entrust the monitoring and 
administration to private companies. Even for the Courts governments can consider 
the real possibility to outsource their dispute resolution services to certified private 
providers.              
 
Is this a realistic scenario? In this paper, we explore the idea of Microjustice. We 
discuss whether it is possible to reinvent first world legal institutions to suit third 
world environments and budgets. Can we develop paths to justice for the poor that are 
economically sustainable, in the sense that they are attractive to use for the poor and 
at the same time attractive to deliver by the suppliers, without substantive subsidies by 
either state or donors?        
II.  JUSTICE: DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
A.  Existing Paradigms: Access to Justice and Rule of Law 
The access to justice paradigm takes the point of view of a person having access to a 
system of rules, authorities, and procedures. Improving access is then improving the 
institutions: better rules, training judges, appointing officials, and educating lawyers, 
as well as opening up more efficient procedures. This approach is visible in the five 
waves of attempts to improve access to justice that socio-legal literature distinguishes: 
improving access to legal aid, public interest law, informal justice such as mediation, 
competition policy, and requiring organizations to create access to justice mechanisms 
for  their  customers,  employees,  and  other  stakeholders  (Parker  1999,  Mc  Donald 
2003).  
A similar approach is behind the programs that aim to improve the rule of law in 
developing countries. These programs try  to bring values to life such  as security, 
legitimacy  (democratic  governance),  judicial  independence,  checks  and  balances 
(separation of powers) and due process. In practice though, rule of law programs often   6 
deal  with  rewriting  codes,  improving  the  management  of  judicial  institutions,  and 
training the police or judges. 
Because “access to the system” is the perspective, the literature on improving access 
to justice tends to frame the issue as one of removing obstacles to this access (Abregu 
2001, Anderson 2003). Both at the supply side and at the demand side of the users of 
the system, there are “deficiencies” that need to be remedied. At the supply side, the 
story continues, the legal system may not provide legal services adequately because of 
poor  organization,  discrimination  towards  specific  groups  or  individuals,  lack  of 
accessibility, lack of adequate legal aid system, and slowness of the system. Laws, 
regulations,  and  case  law  can  be  difficult  to  understand.    Procedures  may  be 
formalistic, and not fitting for the problem.  At the demand side, they notice problems 
such as distance to the institutions, lack of legal knowledge, lack of practical know-
how and skills, lack of financial resources to cover the costs, lack of power to address 
the legal and administrative institutions in order to supply better services, or lack of 
power  to  confront  an  opposing  party.  Fear  for  retaliation  from  the  system,  from 
opponents, or from others, can be an important deterrent in the use of the justice 
system, in particular after a war or civil conflict. Justice, the story seems to go, can be 
obtained in a beautiful castle, and access is a matter of paving the roads that lead to it, 
paying people to guide the way, chasing away the ones who make this road unsafe, 
building bridges across the canal that surrounds the fortress, and learning the justice 
providers inside to cope with their bureaucratic tendencies. 
This perspective is an invitation to start working on all those barriers and to remove as 
many of them as possible. That is often the gist of access to justice programs by 
government aid agencies and NGO’s. Many of them have collected best practices. A 
characteristic example is the Practitioners Guide of UNDP (UNDP 2005), that uses a 
model of access to justice with three major levels: normative protection, capacity to 
provide justice remedies through improving institutions, and capacity at the demand 
side (legal empowerment, legal awareness, and legal aid). It contains long lists of 
obstacles at each level, together with a myriad of possible strategies and entry points 
to address these obstacles.   
The problem with these existing approaches, however, is that they implicitly try to 
build first world institutions with third world resources and in third world realities. 
Setting  up  a  legal  system  with  a  judiciary,  modern  codes  of  civil  and  criminal 
procedure and a legal aid scheme that covers the majority of the population requires 
budgets that are beyond the means of developing countries. Even if those budgets 
could be found, they may not lead to stable situations in countries that are otherwise 
very poor. Legal aid subsidies, for instance, are likely to be channeled towards more 
urgent needs by the persons that are entitled to them. Well-funded courts with life 
tenure for judges can become career opportunities for powerful people who are not 
necessarily the best in the administration of justice.   
Moreover, access to justice and rule of law programs tend to shelter the system from 
pressure to innovate. Donors and governments try to fix existing institutions, hoping 
they will become more accessible for the poor. But these systems have no incentives 
to adjust to the needs and capacities of the poor. If the poor do not have the capacities 
to use the system, they are helped to address the system with legal aid. The implied 
message to the people in the castle is that they do not have to adjust their services to   7 
become more user-friendly. The message to the clients is that they have to adjust their 
needs and capacities so that they can come to the justice castle.   
The Microjustice approach invites us to begin at the other end: In which situations do 
people  need  access  to  justice?  What  capacities  do  they  have  to  cope  with  these 
problems? How can legal services be designed that fit the needs, budgets and skills of 
the  people?  How  can  providers  of  justice  make  their  living  by  supplying  these 
services?  
B.  Basic Legal Needs and Capacities to Fulfill These Needs 
Let  us  first  regard  the  situation  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  demand  side, 
independently of what the existing legal system offers. What are the basic legal needs 
of individuals and what are the capacities of the users of the legal system to cope with 
them? 
There is little systematic research about the situations in which the need for access to 
justice is most urgent. Even the concept of a legal need is difficult to define without 
using words like justice, legal, or rights, which tend to make the definition circular.  
We may assume, however, that legal needs are the needs of a person for protection 
against the conduct of another person or institution, or, more broadly, for help with 
solving  a  problem  in  a  relationship  with  another  person  or  institution.  Personal 
security is important, but also the peaceful settlement of conflicts of interests that may 
arise between employee and employer, tenant and landlord, or neighbors. This shelter 
comes from outsiders, and is preferably neutral. It can come from norms and from 
interventions that structure behavior. Seen from this angle, it is immediately clear that 
the shelter provided by formal norms and interventions competes with informal norms 
and interventions, and also with other tools to protect one-self. So what is the business 
of the legal system?     
One source of the most urgent legal needs is the line of research in which people are 
surveyed about their problems which raised legal issues (ABA 1994, Genn 1999, Van 
Velthoven & Ter Voert 2004, Pleasence et al. 2004, Coumarelos et al. 2006). These 
legal needs surveys give a fairly uniform pattern of the frequency and severity of 
matters that raised legal issues. Another way to establish the urgency of legal needs is 
to investigate the situations in which people need protection. This method assumes 
that  the  needs  for  protection  vary  with  the  value  of  the  interests  at  stake,  the 
probability that the other person hurts the interests, the possibilities of self-protection, 
and the possibilities of fleeing the situation (Barendrecht, Kamminga & Verdonschot 
2007). In a family relationship, for instance, the value of interests at stake is high, 
family members may become threats to each others interests, self-protection may be 
very difficult to arrange, and the costs of splitting up are high. This indicates rather 
urgent legal needs in the form of protection against domestic violence and divorce 
proceedings that mitigate the costs of splitting up. Finally, the urgency of legal needs 
may be derived from the specialization of courts. Many countries have specialized 
criminal courts, family courts, and employment courts, and we may assume that they 
address rather important legal needs. On the basis of the little research that has been 
done, it is possible to list legal needs that are likely to be most urgent (see Table 1).    8 
Table 1: Legal Needs 
Category  Threats  Norms needed (issues to be regulated)  Interventions needed (processes) 
Scarcity  Not effective  Other than legal  1 Subsistence needs 
Welfare benefits not paid by agency  Entitlements  Complaint, settlement, judgment. 
Aggression by outside groups, robbery  Self-evident  Prevention strategies (peace-keeping, policing, poverty 
reduction, etc.), retributive/restorative justice 
Aggression by insiders (family 
members, neighbors) 
Self-evident  Prevention strategies (psychiatric treatment, early warning, 
better dispute resolution), restorative justice 
Unfair detention/police treatment   Conditions for pretrial detention, police 
conduct 
Complaint, judgment 
2 Basic personal 
security 
Negligence (accidents)  Safety rules, liability rules, damages 
scheduling 
Prevention strategies, tort claims settlement, judgment 
Property crime  Self-evident  Prevention strategies, criminal (retributive) justice 
Insufficient property registration  Self-evident  Registration procedures. 
Claims on property by others  Ownership in ambiguous situations  Property claims settlement, judgment 
3 Property rights 
protection 
Expropriation by government or private 
developers. 
Determining fair compensation   Determining compensation 
4 Identity issues and 
documents 
Bureaucratic authorities, individuals 
opposing registration 
Self-evident  Registration procedures, complaint procedures. 
Landowner asking high share/rent   Norms on rent and maintenance  Incentives to follow norms, procedures to settle issues  5 Problems in land 
use relationships  Eviction  Norms on termination and its consequences  Settlement of termination issues, judgment 
Employer offering low wage, labor 
conditions. 
Norms on employment conditions  Incentives to follow norms, settlement of  employment 
issues, judgment 
6 Problems in 
employment 
relationships  Unfair dismissal  Employment protection norms  Settlement of termination issues, judgment 
Domestic violence, unfair 
treatment/exploitation of women and 
children 
Norms prohibiting violence  Interventions in extreme cases,  restorative justice  7 Problems in family 
relationships 
Termination  Norms for division of assets and other 
consequences 
Cooperative settlement of divorce issues, inheritance issues, 
judgment 
8 Problems in 
neighbor 
relationships 
Disturbances, environmental damage, 
neighbor violence 
Norms for nuisance and shared use  Settlement of neighbor issues, judgment, restorative justice   9 
9 Problems with 
sellers of 
goods/services 
Fraud, low quality goods.   Norms for quality and consumer  information  Factfinding on  quality issues, settlement, judgment. 
Untrustworthy or problematic business 
partners 
Default rules for business transactions  Settlement of business conflicts, judgment 
Government exploitation  Transparent tax rules  Tax procedures, anti-corruption strategies 
Extortion by criminals  Self-evident  Prevention strategies 
10 Business 
problems 
Bureaucracy  Self-evident  Strategies to improve bureaucratic procedures  
11 Debt problems  Debts not paid  Self-evident  Debt collection, enforcement, insolvency procedures 
12 Problems with 
financial services 
Fraud, conflicts about performance.  Norms for pre-contractual information, norms 
for loss sharing   
Settlement of damages, judgment 
Source: Barendrecht, Kamminga & Verdonschot 2007   10 
 
And what are the capacities people have to deal with their legal needs? For each of 
those situations, the persons with legal needs will have capacities that will help them 
to cope: communication skills, the possibility of advice from peers, knowledge of 
social norms. They can use their contacts, invest time, and some money as well. Some 
people in villages will have mobile telephones, a computer, or an internet-connection. 
Those capacities can be used. Any commercial provider of services would start from 
here: the needs of the customers and his or her capacities. Then he would consider 
whether he could offer a service that fits those needs and capacities, and still make a 
profit.         
C.  Market and State as Providers of Justice 
That is the way of approaching the problem of access to justice that the analogy to 
microcredit suggests. Let us now further explore this analogy from the supply side. It 
implies that justice can be seen as a service that is obtained by users, who pay a price 
for access to this service. The suppliers (judges, officials, lawyers, police) have to 
make costs for this delivery. They will only enter the “market” of particular legal 
needs in situations where it is attractive for them to deliver this service. We should 
strive to develop ways of administering justice that are affordable to the poor and also 
attractive to deliver for the providers of these services. Unless supply meets demand 
effectively, there will be no justice.    
This market approach may seem inappropriate for a service like the delivery of justice 
that is so strongly linked to the state. As we will see later, the picture of a market that 
provides justice has to be adjusted in many respects.  
However,  let  us  first  try  to  be  realistic  about  the  image  of  justice  as  something 
provided by the state. Arguably, most justice is provided by the market already, and 
by  many  forms  of  hybrids  between  market  and  government  intervention.    Local 
justice  is  often  provided  by  peer  pressure,  village  elders,  or  other  informal 
interventions. Where formal property registration does not work, informal systems of 
registering  ownership  will  develop  (De  Soto  1989).  Even  in  countries  with 
sophisticated  legal  systems,  many  legal  needs  will  be  met  through  self-help, 
negotiations between parties involved or by providers of alternative dispute resolution 
services (such as mediators and arbitrators). Legal needs surveys show that only a 
small minority of legal issues reaches the courts. Even in a procedure before a state 
court, the majority of tasks is generally performed by lawyers, court-reporters, and 
experts, who collect the bulk of the fees. What we see as a classical task for the state, 
is in reality much more like a bundle of services provided by the market, with only 
some components delivered by state officials.   
Even the idea that some elements of the norms and interventions that satisfy legal 
needs can only be delivered by the state can be challenged. Dispute resolution by 
courts, for instance, can be seen as a bundle of the following interventions: letting the 
parties communicate, facilitating negotiations, organizing incentives on both parties to 
cooperate  with  the  process,  fact-finding,  setting  norms  for  distributive  justice, 
deciding on issues that split the parties, and organizing enforcement. Each of these 
activities can be delivered by courts and other state officials, as well as by the market 
itself.  Although norms for conduct or for distributive justice can be set by the State,   11 
these may already be present in the form of social norms or even be designed by 
private rulemaking. Enforcement can be induced by the threat of official intervention, 
but  also  by  group  pressure,  by  reputation  mechanisms,  or  by  interventions  from 
private, officially certified agents such as bailiffs.  
D.  Costs and Benefits for Users and Suppliers 
If we agree that the market is very much present in the realm of fulfilling legal needs, 
it makes sense to find out how the market for justice works. Again, this is not an issue 
that  is  well  researched.  Economists  tend  to  assume  property  rights  protection  and 
contract  enforcement  are  in  place.  Law  and  economics  is  mostly  about  optimal 
institutional design, how rules and institutions would look like ideally, not about the 
market forces that create such institutions on a state-wide level. The literature about 
the supply of legal services mostly regards the market for lawyers as agents for one of 
the parties, not about the market for mediators, arbitrators, courts, or other neutral 
institutions (Hadfield 2000, is an interesting exception). So, we have to explore this 
novel territory without much guidance. We should be curious, but have to be cautious 
as well.  
At  the  demand  side,  for instance,  the  market  perspective  shows  us  that  access  to 
justice is a good that has benefits for the user, as well as a price. Somebody asking for 
a permit to build a house on his property, for an intervention by the police in a fight, 
or for a court decision in an employment dispute will expect certain benefits from 
invoking this intervention. These benefits may be the value of the assets that can be 
recovered or protected by the intervention, as well as the procedural justice that the 
complainant experiences during the process. He will also have to spend money, time 
and effort. These costs of a path to justice can be fees for lawyers or payable to 
bureaucrats,  the  time  spent,  the  costs  of  uncertainty  during  the  procedure,  or  the 
damage to relationships (Barendrecht, Mulder & Giesen, 2006).  
If the expected costs exceed the benefits for the complainant, he will not try to access  
the intervention. That the poor often cannot afford access to the legal system has been 
documented  extensively  by  Hernando  de  Soto  and  other  researchers.  They  have 
shown  that  registering  property,  or  getting  the  licenses  necessary  for  starting  a 
business, entails costs of several times an average yearly income in many developing 
countries (De Soto 1990, 2000).  
Moreover, the user trying to access an intervention will compare its costs and benefits 
with other paths to similar outcomes. The user may have the choice between a formal 
court, an informal plea to a village elder, or hiring a person who can use force against 
the defendant. So what we call the formal legal system competes with informal ways 
to cater for legal needs.    
At  the  supply  side,  the  market  perspective  allows  us  to  take  a closer  look  at  the 
incentives on lawyers, mediators, judges, officials, and law enforcement officers who 
have to deliver this service. For them, delivery of “just interventions” to the poor has 
to  be  an  attractive  proposition.  This  is  clearly  true  for  the  legal  services  that  are 
provided by the market, but it is also an instructive way to look at services provided 
by government officials and the judiciary. If incentives on those persons to deliver 
this service (salary, fees, supervision, but also the positive feelings connected with 
professionalism and altruism) are insufficient in comparison to the costs of delivery   12 
(labor,  expenses,  possible  sanctions)  the  justice  service  is  not  very  likely  to  be 
delivered. In this perspective, making justice both attractive to “buy” and attractive to 
“deliver” is key.  
E.  Failure on the Market for Justice Services? 
This perspective is also different in terms of the solutions that can be found to the 
problem of access to justice. In case there is no match between supply and demand for 
justice, we no longer think of all the concrete obstacles and barriers that have to be 
removed. In any market, there are enormous obstacles to be surmounted before a good 
can satisfy the demands of the consumer. Instead, we are invited to contemplate issues 
of innovation, missing markets, market failure, or government failure. The question 
now becomes: Why can cooperation between people not bring about access to justice 
when there is a clear demand for it? 
We do not know of a systematic appraisal of the market for justice and the need for 
government  intervention.  Unlike  other  areas  where  government  intervention  is 
common  (education,  health  care,  social  security),  the  need  for  intervention  in  the 
market for justice and legal services is not studied systematically. Several authors, 
however, point to possible problems on the market for legal services:  
•  Problems  of  asymmetric  information  are  among  the  classical  reasons  for 
intervention in the market for lawyers (Stephen and Love 2000). However, in this 
respect the market for legal services is not different from markets for, say, IT-
services, architects, or doctors. 
•  Access to justice for claims with no direct monetary value, or with low monetary 
value,  may  be  problematic  because  financing  claims  is  difficult  (see  Yeazell 
2006). If a no-cure/no-pay deal with a lawyer cannot be struck access, will be 
limited.  
•  In case of conflict, the disputants may face severe coordination problems when 
they try to hire a neutral person to assist them with deciding on their differences 
(Barendrecht & De Vries 2006). This may be the core reason why the resolution 
of disputes is a classical government task, although the market offers a full range 
of  alternative  dispute  resolution  services  that  can  do  anything  a  court  can  do, 
services that are rated favorably by their users.  
•  This “market failure” may also lead to a lack of innovation in justice services. 
Because  “default”  court  and  government  procedures  attract  the  majority  of 
disputants anyhow, they feel no pressure to innovate and to become more user-
friendly (Barendrecht & De Vries 2006).  
•  Complexity of the legal rules and procedures, with insufficient incentives on legal 
professionals to simplify them (Hadfield 2000). 
•  The  regulation  of  lawyers  (prohibition  of  legal  services  by  non-lawyers, 
restrictions on access to court jobs for non-lawyers, obligatory use of lawyers in 
courts, restrictions in advertising, price-regulation, prohibition of no cure no pay 
arrangements) may be intended to protect the user of legal services, but it can also   13 
become a barrier to innovation, competition, and access to justice in itself (Ogus 
2002, Paterson et al.).   
From this very preliminary list of possible structural problems on the market for legal 
services, two things are immediately clear. First, suppliers of new forms of justice 
services will have to find ways to overcome these difficulties. For instance, they will 
have  to  cope  with  the  fundamental  problem  that  justice  is  a  good  hat  has  to  be 
attractive for two parties in a conflict at the same time. Both disputants must have 
reasons to buy this form of justice. Often, suppliers will need at least some help from 
local groups or authorities to achieve that. They will also have to face the issue of 
enforcement, although this can be reframed as  an issue of sufficient incentives to 
cooperate with the delivery of justice. Secondly, suppliers of microjustice will have to 
cope  with  the  existing  regulations  on  the  market  for  justice,  which  can  be  quite 
restrictive. States will differ greatly in their “business climate” for innovative justice 
services. Often, restrictive rules and bureaucratic practices will have to be changed 
before services can be developed that give citizens access to their rights.    
III.  SOME DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLES 
Let us now turn to the  development of innovative forms of justice that reach the 
persons that are now not able to obtain justice. How can Microjustice proceed from 
the drawing board to reality? We discuss some possible contributions to what could 
become a technology of developing affordable and sustainable justice. Then we turn 
to some more examples of what microjustice could look like, for some of the legal 
needs categories we identified (Section IV).  
A.  Justice for the Bottom of the Pyramid 
Microjustice may use the same underlying reasoning as other initiatives regarding 
services for people with limited resources. Drawing from other examples of profitable 
products for the poor, C.K. Prahalad and Stuart L. Hart have described twelve design 
principles in the “The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid” (Prahalad 2004, see also 
Hammond et al. 2006). The challenge is to translate these principles into development 
principles for microjustice. In this essay, we can do no more than make a few remarks 
on each of them: 
•  “Focus on price performance of products and services. Quantum jumps in price 
performance are required.” Like microcredit and other examples from the quoted 
book show, microjustice should not aim to halve the price per unit of justice as 
provided by western lawyers and courts, but should strive for solutions that cost  
not more than 10% or even 1% of the western examples.  
•  “Innovation requires hybrid solutions. Mix advanced and emerging technologies 
with existing and evolving infrastructures.” Microjustice can blend elements from 
the long-established legal systems and local justice structures as for example the 
Justicia  Comunitaria  which  is  developed  in  Bolivia,  with  state  of  the  art 
information  technology  and  the  newest  psychological  insights  on  compliance. 
Dispute resolution techniques that have a track record in mediation can be adapted 
to the skills that are locally available.    
•  “The method is scalable and transportable across countries, culture and languages, 
and  at  the  same  time  solutions  must  be  tailor-made  according  to  the  local   14 
situation.”  The  problems  people  face  in  their  lives  are  often  also  their  legal 
problems. These problems are rather universal, and the solutions will tend to have 
similarities as well.   
•  “Look for solutions that use little capital and other resources.” The essence of 
dispute  resolution  processes  is  that  disputants  meet  and  discuss  their  dispute 
before  a  neutral  person.  It  may  be  possible  to  do  so  without  expensive  court 
buildings, without costly legal aid, and without extensive paper files that have to 
be stored and kept. Building a website is much cheaper than a courthouse. Local 
labor less costly than city lawyers. 
•  “Obtain deep insight in functionality, not just form. Marginal changes to services 
developed for rich customers will not do.” This is a very important message to the 
designers of elements of the legal system. A typical code of procedure contains 
thousands of rules. But what exactly are the steps in the procedure, their function, 
and the ways to deliver these components in a manner that is efficient for anyone 
in the supply-chain?  
•  “Process innovations are critical. The presence of a logistics infrastructure cannot 
be assumed.” Delivery of policing services is completely different if people live in 
places  that  cannot  be  reached  over  a  proper  road.  So  protection  has  to  be 
organized locally, and possibly privately, but with sufficient links to the back up 
of a central system.    
•  “Adjust to environments with poor infrastructure and limited skills.” Legal skills 
to sort out legislation and case law cannot be assumed. The applicable rules will 
have to be easily accessible, easy to understand and easy to apply.  
•  “Education  of  customers  on  product  and  services  usage  is  key.”  Many  things 
lawyers  do  can  be  learned  by  others  as  well:  communicating  with  opponents, 
formulating excuses for conduct, and settling disputes. A courts, or whoever deals 
with disputes as a neutral, can help customers to make their points by asking the 
right questions, and explaining what the steps in the procedure are.  Microjustice 
provides on-hands basic legal education to people, on the basis of which they will 
use the Microjustice services to access their rights. Direct marketing techniques 
can be developed and door-to-door basic legal education. Also if Microjustice will 
be delivered in schools, awareness will be raised among children and their parents 
about the fact that they have rights in practice. 
•  “Services must work in hostile environments.” In post-conflict situations, neutral 
and trustworthy persons are hard to find. So panels deciding on disputes should be 
formed very carefully and if possible with the agreement of both disputants.   
•  “Research  on  interfaces  is  critical.  Consumers  differ  in  skills,  experience, 
language etc.”  
•  “Innovations  must  reach  the  consumer.”  Courts,  lawyers,  and  officials  have 
changed many processes in their back-offices. The interface with the customer, 
however, is still very similar to what it looked like 100 years ago: an intake where 
a lawyer takes notes, or a court hearing,       15 
•  “Product developers can focus on the platform. The feature and function evolution 
can  be  very  rapid  if  they  are  developed  centrally.”  A  platform  that  supports 
services that are an answer to legal needs in the realm of divorce or for conflicts 
between neighbors can be developed centrally. It could entail standard questions 
for an intake, a collection of norms for dealing with standard issues, and standard 
suggestions for agreements between disputants, which could also be the standard 
format  for  a  judgment  if  the  parties  would  not  agree  on  an  issue.  Once  this 
standard is in place, other content can be added locally: specific norms, typical 
issues for a specific community, or additional elements of a document that settles 
the issue.   
B.  Justice Know How  
These development principles are general principles for services to be developed for 
the poor. Microjustice can also profit from an enormous body of know how that has 
been collected about matters closely related to justice during the last 50 years. This 
has  been  the  work  of  social-psychologists,  decision  theorists,  criminologists, 
victimologists,  economists,  negotiation  theorists,  management  theorists,  therapists, 
mediation theorists, and ADR practitioners, who often cooperated with lawyers.  
This know how is available, but it has not yet been used systematically for innovation 
of the systems of criminal and civil justice. The rules of civil and criminal procedure 
tend to be designed by lawyers, who take their guidance primarily from existing legal 
rules and legal principles. Innovative methods such as mediation and problem-solving 
criminal courts struggle to get their place at the fringes of the system. Know-how that 
is not legal is often treated as “expert knowledge,” which implies that it is foreign to 
the legal system. In the core of the legal system, where lawyers and courts have the 
lead, people with legal training dominate. Their method of finding  ways to apply 
existing legal norms to issues is still prevailing. In this manner, the legal system is 
shielded from innovation. If Microjustice can find a way around this, an enormous 
potential for innovation may become available.   
Here are some of the areas of knowledge about justice that are ready to be used for 
setting up innovative legal services: 
•  Procedural justice research has clarified why people comply with legal norms or 
with decisions by authorities. It has identified the elements of a procedure that are 
essential in order to induce acceptance to the outcome. It also clarified to some 
extent which type of procedures people prefer (MacCoun 2005, Sunstein 2006).   
•  Conflict  theorists  and  negotiation  researchers  have  developed  the  method  of 
integrative negotiations. The basic idea behind it is that disputants should focus on 
their interests. Its toolbox contains many techniques for communication that have 
proved their value in practice (Raiffa et al. 2002, Lewicki et al. 2004).    
•  Economists  and  negotiation  theorists  have  developed  knowledge  about  the 
settlement process that takes place in the shadow of the law. Incentives on the 
parties and on lawyers have been shown to have a considerable effect on this 
process.  Researchers  have  also  sorted  out  which  elements  of  a  negotiation 
environment induce cooperation (Bazerman et al. 2000; De Dreu et al. 2000).     16 
•  Criminologists doing “What works” research have collected evidence about the 
effects of programs that deal with criminals (Welsh & Farrington 2006).  
•  Victimologists have obtained a rather precise picture of the needs of victims, and 
also of the effects of various programs that intend to take care of these needs 
(Fattah 2000). 
•  Law  and  economics,  as  well  as  research  into  fairness  and  distributive  justice 
(Konow  2003),  has  delivered  many  insights  in  the  acceptability  of  norms that 
decide the outcomes. Legal norms have mostly been found to be in line with this 
research, but often give the message in a much more complicated way, because 
courts had to fit reasonable solutions in an existing system of rules. This research 
suggests  that  many  substantive  legal  rules  can  be  formulated  in a more direct 
manner and be made much easier to understand.   
•  On line dispute resolution. ODR has become a field on its own. It has delivered a 
variety of online dispute resolution tools that work in practice, such  as online 
bidding systems and the dispute resolution system operated by E-Bay (Raines & 
Conley Tyler 2006).    
C.  Existing Business Models as Opportunities for Learning 
As we have seen, meeting a legal need is often a matter of linking several services in a 
supply chain. Some services are organized or subsidized by the state, whilst users 
have to pay the full costs of other services. Because subsidies are scarce, many urgent 
legal needs are met already by services offered by the market. So there is much to 
learn from the business models that are already in place.  
Legal services are mostly services to one of the parties in disputes or in setting up 
transactions. Here, the most common business model is clear: lawyers try to work for 
the most interesting clients with the deepest pockets. The bottom of the pyramid is 
served by people who cannot make it to the top of the profession, or by people who let 
other motives prevail over the profitability of their business. A model for one-sided 
legal  services  that  can  be  an  interesting  example,  however,  is  the  one  of  legal 
expenses  insurers.  They  have  to  deal  with  their  cases  efficiently,  and  thus  are 
constantly looking for economies of scale. They have to find the balance between 
obtaining good results for their clients in order to keep them satisfied and low costs. 
Dutch legal expenses insurers publicly state that lawyers they sometimes have to hire 
externally are about three times as expensive then their in house lawyers, which gives 
an indication of the jumps in price performance that are still possible. 
Generally, however, legal advice is not what the person with a legal need is after. 
What he wants is a change of behavior of somebody else, so what he needs is a 
neutral intervention. So let us look into the existing business models in that area. 
Some countries have judiciaries that deal rather efficiently with small claims. The 
justices of the peace of the civil law countries can be successful examples of fairly 
efficient  claim  handling,  although  many  of  their  procedures  seem  old-fashioned. 
Simple debt collection can now be done in an on line procedure in many countries, 
and for courts this seems to be rather profitable business.    17 
And of course there is an endless variety of alternative dispute resolution services, 
from the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris to many types of mediation 
services and on to the Rondas Campesinas in rural Peru. Interestingly, however, most 
of these services are set up as a platform that can be used by the parties if they agree 
to it. This business model attracts some clients, but it is hard to sustain it, unless the 
providers have organized a major stream of referrals from courts, local leaders, or 
other neutrals, or else get clients on a regular basis because their contracts choose this 
platform as the way to cope with possible disputes.    
A more attractive model, in particular for helping the poor, may be one in which the 
person that desires a change in the status quo can chose the provider of the neutral 
dispute  resolution  service.  This  model  has  obvious  disadvantages  for  defendants, 
however. They should at least have some control over the neutrality of the service 
provider. Moreover, this model only gives the right incentives if the amount charged 
from the plaintiff and the defendant together covers the costs of the neutral. If the 
neutral  service  provider  cannot  determine  its  own  price,  and  is  also  bound  to 
procedural requirements that make its service expensive, this model is likely to fail. 
These are complex issues, which may explain why this model is not commonly used 
in its purest form. It is more or less by accident, that procedural arrangements give the 
plaintiff the choice between various providers of justice that have to compete for the 
business. Examples are rules of civil procedure under which the plaintiff can choose 
which court he addresses and dispute resolution clauses in standard contracts that give 
consumers or employees the choice between addressing a certain ADR provider or a 
court. The same choice may exist in situations where state institutions cannot enforce 
their monopoly on justice services, leaving room for local justice providers to serve 
the clients. 
It is also interesting to take a closer look at the business models behind legal reform 
projects in developing countries. As an example, we take a project in which one of us 
was involved in former Yugoslavia. The falling  apart of Yugoslavia into six new 
republics  did  not  only  result  in  huge  waves  of  refugees,  but  also  into  many  new 
borders and frontiers, which became legal and administrative barriers. The around 
500.000 refugees from Croatia that had come to Serbia from 1991 to 2000 needed to 
restore their property rights, obtain reconstruction loans, and obtain a legal status in 
either Serbia or Croatia. This involved complex cross-border paperwork, to which the 
authorities in Croatia did not cooperate smoothly, and which was also not a priority 
for the humanitarian legal aid programs in Serbia, that only provided legal aid within 
Serbia and did not help the refugees across the border.  
By  creating  a  network  of  lawyers,  paralegals  and  volunteers  on  both  sides  of  the 
border International Legal Alliances (ILA), an NGO based in The Hague, has been 
able  to  supply  many  thousands  of  refugees  with  documents  like  birth-certificates, 
citizenship-certificates and proof of property, which are necessary to return to the 
country of origin or to start a new life in the host country. The basic set up of the 
operation is described in Table 2. In addition, ILA had to initiate hundreds of test 
cases, write comprehensive reports, lobby authorities and international organizations 
that  could  influence  the  situation,  organize  seminars,  and  everything  else  that  is 
necessary to let things go more efficiently.  
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Table 2: Cross-Border Legal Service for Refugees in Serbia to Access the Legal and 
Administrative System in Croatia (International Legal Alliances) 
 
The business model of this program has been a typical human rights program, aimed 
at assistance for the weakest refugees. The Dutch Government, UNHCR, and Dutch 
charitable organizations paid for it. This fits the idea of the responsibility to protect: 
these  people  are  blameless  victims  of  the  war;  the  community  is  responsible  for 
restoring their legal position. Funding obtained in this way, however, can only be 
obtained for the most urgent legal needs and is also dependent on the attention of the 
international aid community. So the funding stopped before the needs of all clients 
were met.  
A  more  permanent  and  sustainable  model  has  been  difficult  to  find,  in  particular 
because UNHCR prohibits requesting the slightest contribution from the beneficiaries 
to pay for the services. Local and international NGOs consider this as ‘not done,’ or 
even as an ‘illegal activity’ that amounts to ‘theft’ from poor people. Moreover, the 
governments  expressed  a  bureaucratic-,  passive-,  and  anti-entrepreneurial  mindset, 
which made it difficult to discuss the desired services and possibilities for covering 
the costs with them.  In sum, donors, governments, lawyers, and clients needed to 
cooperate  closely  to  get the  supply  chain  going.  If  they  would  have  talked  about 
efficient  services  and  ways  of  covering  the  costs  in  a  permanent  way  instead  of 
looking at their rules, the program could have reached many more people.      
D.  Program Design and Product Development of Microjustice Programs 
Microjustice has to be developed in concrete contexts. Here, it can of course profit 
from  the  experience  with  program  design  of  many  organizations  in  the  access  to 
justice arena. A recent literature review has been compiled by the Swiss Agency for 
Development and Cooperation (Byrne, Mirescu & Müller 2007). There is much to 
 
ILA’s Serbian partner organization HCIT (Humanitarian Centre for Integration and Tolerance) consists 
of lawyers,  who themselves  are refugees from  Croatia. Therefore they  have an easy  access to the 
refugees and have a widespread network of contacts with lawyers and influential figures in Croatia. 
Funded by UNHCR, HCIT is implementing a field legal program covering most towns and villages 
with  major  refugee  concentrations  in  the  north  of  Serbia  (Vojvodina),  where  the  majority  of  the 
refugees have settled. The cross-border mechanism works as follows: 
•  HCIT field lawyer fills out a power of attorney on the name of the refugee and the name of a 
paralegal or lawyer in the region of his/her origin in Croatia. 
•  The refugee goes to the municipal court with the power of attorney to have it verified and stamped, 
and after that (s)he brings the power of attorney back to the lawyer 
•  The powers of attorney are collected in the central office in Novi Sad, where the legal network 
coordinator comes once a week from Vukovar on the other side of the border in Croatia to collect 
the powers of attorney.  The central office also receives powers of attorney from humanitarian 
legal organizations covering the south of Serbia. 
•  In the Vukovar office the powers of attorney are registered and sent to the lawyers and paralegals 
in Croatia. 
•  The paralegals go to the municipal and registry offices and obtain all the relevant documentation, 
which they send back to the Vukovar office. Attorneys represent the refugee in court cases. 
•  The Vukovar office brings the documents to Novi Sad, where the field lawyers give the documents 
to the refugees.  
•  The Vukovar office is manned by two officers who are doing the entire operation, administration, 
and coordination. 
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learn from this literature, but the example from former Yugoslavia shows that the 
business perspective can be very valuable. So the lessons from this literature should 
be merged with know how about product development. As Prahalad and Hart show, 
the ways of multinational companies can be very helpful tools to serve the poor.   
In this essay, we do not go into this in detail. We just give a preliminary list of points 
to consider in the process of designing concrete microjustice services.  
•  Identification and Assessment. Any program will have to start with an analysis of 
the basic legal and administrative needs that have to be addressed. The present 
way to address legal needs will have to be studied, as well as the legal-political 
framework, the relevant case law and legislation, power structures on a central and 
local level, the social-economic situation, the culture, traditions and history (belief 
systems), the logistic infrastructure and accessibility of the countryside (available 
electricity, internet, roads, flights), the available human resources (lawyers, IT & 
computer  experts,  community  workers,  groups  with    unskilled  labour),  and 
institutions and organizations, who could be involved in microjustice. Together 
these create the “business climate” and the feasibility of successful microjustice 
development. 
•  Setting  up  an  initial  team.  Relevant  local  people,  organizations  and  possibly 
government institutions will have to participate in a core working team and in 
various cooperation and supervision structures. 
•  Develop procedures and norms with stakeholders for obtaining general guidance 
on  the  desirable  and  sustainable  legal  solutions  for  the  legal  needs.  Studying 
relevant legislation and case law is usually not enough. Communication channels 
with the relevant authorities and other stakeholders are needed, inviting them to 
provide clear answers: the practicalities of the relevant procedures, time limits, the 
formal  and  informal  fairness  norms  and  procedures  that  really  determine  the 
outcomes in case of disputes or uncertainty. Not the law in the books, but the law 
in action has to be made explicit, because that is the justice that can and will be 
delivered. If there is uncertainty regarding fair outcomes or procedures regarding 
legal needs, a procedure to deal with this uncertainty has to be in place. 
•  Develop legal services through the use of an interactive web-page. The website 
will provide guidance on the substantive norms, and on the procedures, including 
the  practicalities  of  the  procedures.  The  site  can  also  inform  on  the  practical 
implementation in real life. The non-compliance by specific authorities or other 
players would also be published on the website. The site also provides access to 
forms, documents, powers of attorney, etc; without  unnecessary formalities.  
•  The website is the basic instrument for interactive rulemaking and development of 
procedures in accordance with the agreed norms. Regular meetings are held with 
the  relevant  authorities  (executing  administration),  political  and  leading 
administrative levels in order to develop clear rules and procedures to be put on 
the website and which will become a permanent process.  Meetings are also held 
with  the  international  community  representatives  to  exert  pressure  in  solving 
potential  obstacles.  The  approach  here  must  be  to  make  it  attractive  for  all 
stakeholders to cooperate, so their needs have to be taken seriously and have to be 
taken care of. At the same time, no stakeholder should be able to obtain a position   20 
that blocks progress. In case of doubt, the legal needs of the users of the system 
should be the criterion which determines how to proceed.  
•  Pilot phase. Start the program on a pilot scale with a few local service points and 
an operator with legal skills servicing the website and answering questions by e-
mail or phone from the main city.  
•  Preparation  of  large  scale  implementation.  In  order  to  reach  more  people,  a 
distribution  network  of  intermediaries  (local  and  community  service  points)  is 
needed, as well as a publicity campaign, which will have to be developed. 
•  Set  up  and  develop  training  program:  train-the-trainer  programs  and  training 
sessions  for  the  legal  intermediaries.  Handbooks  for  trainers  and  for  the  local 
service points (Microjustice Facilitators).  
•  Identify and train community focal points as paralegals that have access to internet 
in the villages. People come to them with their queries and the community service 
point looks up the particular issue on the website and asks for feedback through e-
mail or phone, etc. The training of persons manning local service points is based 
on the identified legal needs. They will also have to get incentives to provide 
feedback on the website. Specializations will have to be developed based on the 
actual legal needs. If, for example, many people have problems registering land 
title, some paralegals will be trained exclusively to have basic knowledge on this 
procedure, the challenges and issues specific to it.  
•  Identify ways to reach the regions without internet connection. For example: Train 
community focal points in these places. An exchange will take place between the 
community focal points in the villages with internet and without internet. Set-up a 
permanent communication network and back-up system between the center, the 
focal points with internet coverage and the focal points without internet coverage.  
Aim in as much as possible to integrate the villages lacking internet access to get 
them connected. 
•  Develop an effective and efficient system of backup by the central organization. 
Involve  academic  researchers,  lawyers,  paralegals,  technicians  and  other 
Microjustice  team  members  for  facilitating  the  entire  operation.  They  should 
provide feedback to the field operations, providing solutions, collecting feedback 
and implementing any changes that may be necessary.  In addition they are to , 
design and organize practical legal solutions so that the supply and demand sides 
meet.  Moreover, whenever necessary, they will develop possibilities for class 
action and/or other ways to solve problems (cases) for a large group of people 
together.  These solutions for large groups of people may include (but are not 
limited to) cases of registering firms for a lot of people at once through the use of 
a  power  of  attorney.    Other  responsibilities  by  the  staff  in  the  centra  location 
include the constant update the website to include as much current information as 
possible.  They will also develop standard forms, update the basic rules and other 
guiding substantive legal information, select and list focal points, certify people 
that may provide interventions locally (mediators), monitor the implementation, 
and signal cases of corruption and/or non-compliance by the suppliers of justice.   21 
•  Setting  up  as  a  business.  At  some  stage,  and  preferably  from  the  start,  a 
Microjustice  system  should  be  organized  as  a  business,  or  as  a  bundle  of 
independent businesses facilitated by a central organization. If initial subsidies are 
necessary,  a  careful  consideration  is  necessary,  because  the  system  should  not 
become  dependent  on  subsidies.  Options  are  concrete  subsidies  for  concrete 
elements of the system, or vouchers handed out to some categories of users, which 
can be funded by NGO’s. Issues that have to be dealt with are protection of know-
how, profit-sharing, responsibility, certification, and ownership. 
•  Marketing  and  creating  public  awareness.  Unlike  many  established  programs, 
Microjustice services are poised to attract large numbers of clients,.  As such the 
principles of economies of scale are relied upon in order to make the services 
financially sustainable.  
•  Funding and payments. After the initial development phase, the system should 
fund  itself.  This  requires  a  transparent  system  of  fees,  fee-collection,  and  of 
monitoring of financial transactions.   
•  Organize broader setting and supporting network. Work with the local authorities 
on legal capacity building upon the principles of micro justice. Use of law and IT 
students  as  volunteers  is  a  possibility.  This  can  be  for  field  work  (assessing 
particular regions), development of various areas of the website, setting up IT 
infrastructure in the central offices or the field offices, providing answers on legal 
questions asked by e-mail or phone by either the community focal points or the 
clients directly. 
•  Research. All the phases can be used as a basis for research activities. There will 
be opportunities for socio-legal and IT research, but other social sciences may also 
benefit from this sampling. 
IV.  EXAMPLES OF POSSIBLE MICROJUSTICE SERVICES 
In this way, the stage for development of Microjustice is set. Possible applications, for 
some of the categories  of legal needs that we  have identified, follow. In order to 
stimulate the imagination of the reader, some scenarios that show how the application 
of Microjustice in certain areas and aspects would be are described below. As these 
are fictitious scenarios to stimulate discussion and feedback, real-life application may 
well be different. Not all the technology described already exists, and if it does, it is 
not yet in place in every local community. But during the next years, it will certainly 
become widely available in the cities and in bigger villages. We also appreciate that 
there  must  be  many  persons  and    organizations that  are  already  considering  such 
applications  or  have  them  in  place.  We  invite  them  to  share  their  views  so  that, 
relying on these experiences, a more  realistic and practical implementation of the 
Microjustice approach can be achieved.   
A.  Criminal Justice 
What is the essence of a community reaction to a crime? It may not be a full blown 
criminal procedure. Taking care of the victim may be the first priority. Then follows 
an investigation, which can be organized in many ways, within the constraints of the 
available resources. Protection of victim and alleged perpetrator will be necessary. A 
trial  may  be  necessary  to  establish  what  exactly  happened.  More  often  than  not,   22 
however,  it  is  rather  clear  what  happened,  and  the  main  issue  will  be  which 
combination of restorative justice and punishment is adequate.  
In order to organize this, a local facilitator is appointed, who takes care that there is 
some person who reports the facts, someone assisting the victim and someone else 
assisting the defendant.  Finally, some persons are trusted to decide on the appropriate 
interventions. A necessary link between this local application and the central system 
is a website. This website shows the criteria for reactions to specific (similar) types of 
crime,  taking  into  account  insight  from  victimology  and  criminology.  Possible 
reactions  include  compensation,  interventions  aimed  at  healing    or  sanctions.  All 
participants to the process have access to the guidelines on this website, either through 
a computer screen in the room, or through a print out of the most important norms. 
To  make  this  work,  procedures  have  to  be  in  place  with  sufficient  safeguards. 
Procedures  are  not  described  in  articles  in  a  code  of  procedure,  but  in  informal 
language, describing the steps of the process and stating the goals of every stage.  
Procedural  rules  are  not  goals  in  themselves,  but  are  standardized  solutions  for 
problems that occur frequently.  
A  webcam  and  a  microphone  register  what  happens.  They  replace  costly  written 
documents. Because the procedure is recorded, any person with access to the internet 
can examine what happened. A supervising body uses the recordings to give feedback 
to the local facilitator, so that the quality of the procedure can improve. The defendant 
has a right to appeal to this body which, following conferences with the defendant 
may adjust the actual outcome (punishment).  
The facilitator and the system are paid for by a contribution from the local fund that is 
kept  by  the  village  elders.  Fines  go  into  this  fund  as  well.  Using  trained  and 
experienced people in the roles of this process is seen as something that is desirable, 
but if there is no money to pay for them, the process will work with volunteers, rather 
than leaving the crime unpunished. 
B.  Protection Against Expropriation 
With  the  help  of  Google  Earth,  that  may  be  increasing  the  area  covered  by  high 
resolution  imaging  during  the  years  to  come,  tools  may  be  developed  to  provide 
protection to poor people with insufficient property rights. People who feel threatened 
by others who try to take possession of their property, or who had to flee from it 
already, can file a claim on a website. The claim is marked with a flag on digital 
image of the land, and its status is indicated by the color of the flag. The initial claim 
can be filed for a small fee. For an initial neutral evaluation of the claim an additional 
fee must be filed. This  evaluation requires hearing the other party on its position 
regarding the claim. The website contains the standards for monetary compensation 
from every jurisdiction, adjusted for purchasing power, in order to make comparison 
easy for the user. 
On  the  website,  it  is  also  possible  to  see  how  many  claims  building  companies, 
developers, or governments have pending against them. NGO’s use this information 
to put pressure on these organizations to settle such claims. If the claim is settled after 
the filing on the website, a small percentage of the settlement is due as compensation   23 
to the provider of the website. Although enforcement of this obligation is problematic, 
most customers pay this, because they rate the service as excellent.            
C.  Neighbor Disputes 
For disputes between neighbors in a city, it might be feasible to let people complain at 
a local point of entry (Eg. a store within the neighborhood). A complaint can be filed 
on a simple form on a website. Operators of the website, qualified to deal with these 
issues,  may  appoint  a  neutral  person  from  a  list to  deal  with  the  complaint.  This 
neutral person would contact the other party and the system would have incentives 
encouraging the other party to cooperate.  
The  neutral  person  deals  with  the  dispute  for  a  small  fixed  fee,  combining  basic 
mediation techniques with the power to give a binding decision. This person would be 
guided by easily understandable criteria regarding neighborhood disputes, that can be 
found on this website.  These criteria reflect general fairness principles to deal with 
such disputes. The parties have access to these criteria as well. On the website, the 
parties  can  also  find  the  feedback  by  previous  clients  on  the  particular  person 
appointed as the neutral intermediary. The feedback also helps to establish a ranking 
of these neutral intermediaries regarding future assignments.  This is all done through 
the  use  of  software  allowing  the  indexing,  ranking  and  accessibility  of  all  this 
information. 
D.  Disputes in Employment Relationships 
Disputes arising out of an employment relationship are best solved by processes that 
do not stress the relationship. On the other hand, the employee may be in a weaker 
position, as s/he is more dependent on the employer than the other way round.  Legal 
systems  try  to  compensate  for  this  difference  in  power.  Employers,  however, 
complain  about  complicated  court  proceedings  with  uncertain  outcomes.  Private 
mediation  companies  may  in  the  future  offer  a  smart  solution  to  this  problem, 
applying the principles of Microjustice.  
Because  they  understand  that  fair  negotiations  need  the  shadow  of  the  law,  they  
convince the government to set up a simple procedure for a single junior judge in case 
of a conflict, including conflicts about the termination of the contract. The parties can 
explain their case by a simple letter to the judge, which must contain the answer to a 
few  standard  questions  about  the  conflict.  The  judge  decides  the  issues  that  are 
brought  before  the  court  following  a  hearing  of  half  an  hour.  The  government 
guarantees a judgment within one month from the filing of the claim. The employer 
pays the costs of the court, unless the judge finds that the claim of the employee was 
clearly  unreasonable.  The  judge  decides  on  the  basis  of  interpretation  of  the 
employment contract. In case of an unfair or discriminatory dismissal, the court uses a 
schedule for a reasonable compensation, with a discretionary power for the court to 
adjust the compensation in case the circumstances so require. This enables the parties 
to predict the outcome within a reasonable margin.  
What the mediators could gain from this, and what also makes the deal interesting for 
the government, is that most employers and employees prefer to settle their case in a 
way tailored to their needs and the circumstances. If they go to the judge, he will 
roughly weigh the circumstances and come to a rather crude assessment, that may   24 
come as a surprise. So the parties have every incentive to settle. Helping them to work 
out a tailor made settlement has become big business for mediators.  
Mediators are generally paid by employers though, which will rise concerns among 
the  Unions  who  question  their  neutrality.  Consequently,  they  have  to  set  up  an 
independent certification system for mediators.  
The arbitration business can profit as well from  this set up. Directors of companies, 
and other employees who wanted better quality than a speedy procedure before a 
junior judge, now often make specific arrangements for their disputes.  Frequently, 
the choice is made for a mixture of mediation and arbitration before a panel of three 
experts. But this high end service is not forced upon the poor.      
V.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this essay, we explored the needs for access to justice and the problems associated 
with  supplying  it.  We  explained  why  Microjustice,  with  its  orientation  towards 
solutions provided by the market, might be a promising approach. Then, we explored 
what principles may be used to develop innovative legal services for the poor and 
showed some examples of what Microjustice may look like. This section contains a 
discussion of some of the objections against the idea to stimulate the development of 
innovative legal services in the way we described.  
A.  Questions (Asked Frequently) 
During the development phase of the Microjustice Initiative, we encountered many 
questions, all very to the point, and some of which challenged the validity of concept: 
Here  are  the  most  frequently  asked  questions,  with  some  initial  thoughts  about 
answers. 
1.  Is Microjustice Justice for Minor Problems? 
For  some,  the  word  Microjustice  seems  to  refer  to  small  problems,  like  the  ones 
experienced by consumers. Microjustice, however, is intended to become just as real 
and important as microcredit. It should contribute to make life much easier for the 
billions of people who have no access to justice now, because, although they have 
rights, either they and/or their governments may lack the resources to pay for the 
delivery  of  the  extensive  services  that  codes  and  case  law  promise  them.  In  our 
experience, people in developing countries understand that message and for them, the 
association with microcredit means that they start thinking of a justice system that is 
accessible to them.    
2.  Second Rate Justice?  
The goal is to provide real justice. Microjustice does not change any of the principles 
of  justice.  Microjustice  is  about  an  efficient  organization  of  access  to  the  justice 
system, facilitating an effective meeting of supply and demand. This can be achieved 
by more insight in the functionality of the different components of the services that 
form the supply chain of justice. Too many efforts to improve the legal system have 
taken for granted that justice is justice and that a court should provide what a court 
should provide.  
We should reverse-engineer justice and courts. In doing so we can come to the types 
of insight, mentioned above.  Dispute resolution consists of a mixture between and   25 
improvement  in  communication,  facilitation  of  negotiations,  organization  of 
incentives for both parties to cooperate with the process, fact-finding, establishment 
of  norms  for  distributive  justice,  decisions  on  issues  that  split  the  parties  and, 
coordination of enforcement. Similarly, criminal justice can be taken apart, looking at 
what  it  does  for  people.  Nowadays,  it  includes  mechanisms  that  deliver  general 
prevention, fact-finding, reparation, healing and recognition for victims, appropriate 
treatment  for  some  types  of  convicted  criminals,  and  retribution.  Delivering  legal 
services with a focus on what is needed, and not only on what the law says, will lead 
to justice of a higher quality delivered to many more people.   
Moreover, developing  cross-border platforms  for legal services can lead to higher 
quality, because experiences and solutions will be exchanged. Unsatisfactory local 
practices will be more exposed, because users and supervisors of systems can see 
them and compare them with better practices elsewhere.  
3.  A Danger for the Values behind the Justice System? 
No. Microjustice is all about the essential values of procedural justice, distributive 
justice,  retributive  justice,  and  restorative  justice  that  make  respectful  cooperation 
between people possible. These values can be reinforced if justice is done and is seen 
to be done. Transparency, neutrality, independence, predictability, and objectivity are 
also  key.  What  is  new  in  Microjustice  is  that  it  is  realistic,  open-minded,  and 
innovative  about  the  ways  to  achieve  this:  through  the  acts  of  people  who  are 
motivated to deliver justice where it is needed.  
4.  Can Microjustice Cope with Power? 
Not in any definitive way. Powerful and corrupt people may always find ways around 
the  system  for  their  own  personal  advantage  Microjustice  can  make  a  difference, 
however, by providing transparent information on norms and practices. Comparison 
across borders may also help to curb abuse of power.  
5.  Can Microjustice Be Developed Across Borders and Across Cultures? 
Legal  needs  are  rather  similar.  Solutions  are  also  rather  similar.  Even  divorce 
“proceedings” across cultures and countries have certain commonalities. Procedural 
justice,  distributive  justice,  restorative  justice,  and  restorative  justice  are  issues 
everywhere.  Comparatists  and  legal  anthropologists  have  learned  to  focus  on  the 
differences. Because legal systems develop in some isolation from each other, they 
have  followed  different  trajectories.  But  there  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  legal 
systems  of  different  countries  or  different  legal  origins  could  not  profit  from 
economies of scale across borders. 
Multinationals have painstakingly learned to deliver services across borders that cater 
for the same human needs. They now know what can be standardized and what should 
be adjusted to local circumstances. Law firms work across borders as well. So why 
not try it for the legal needs of the poor? This is especially true for the poor living in 
smaller developing countries, where economies of scale within the country cannot be 
found. 
6.  There is Too Much Justice Already! 
Nowadays, lawyers and legal systems do not have an unquestioned reputation. Issues 
like deregulation, the tort system, worries about the administrative costs related to   26 
government, and overburdened courts are high on the political agendas. There is no 
question, however, that some legal system is necessary and that access to justice is 
essential  in  situations  like  the  ones  we  identified  as  the  most  urgent  legal  needs. 
Moreover, Microjustice strives to make rules more accessible and to investigate the 
essence of procedures. Diminishing the administrative costs for citizens is exactly 
what Microjustice is about. 
Still, there could be worries that Microjustice brings waves of people to the courts, 
making life miserable for companies and governments alike. There are many possible 
answers to such objections.  
First, the problem is that a (sizeable) segment  of the population has no access to 
justice because it is too difficult and expensive to obtain it. If work is done on that 
issue specifically, it is implicit that more services will have to be delivered. Secondly, 
poor people (the segment of the population established to have no access to justice) 
live on approx US$2 a day in developing countries. These people will certainly think 
carefully before bringing a case forward (as there are costs, however small, associated 
with Microjustice). Thirdly, there is no evidence that people who have the resources 
are systematically burdening courts with trivial cases.  
The real problem is costs: legal costs, uncertainty, and damage to reputation during 
the time it takes the existing legal system to process a case. That is a problem that 
Microjustice  will  help  to  tackle.  Finally,  the  best  answer  is  to  leave  it  to  a  well-
functioning  market  for  justice.  If  interventions  are  neutral,  transparent, 
predictable,speedily/timely  and  are  performed  against  costs  fully  covered  by  fees 
from the disputants while reflecting the principles of justice, then it can be left to the 
plaintiffs to decide whether that intervention is worth its price.        
7.  Should Justice be Tailormade? 
Providing justice is often seen as a pure people’s business, deliverable as a person-to- 
person  service,  tailored  to  the  parties  and  their  circumstances.  This  personalized 
picture of justice is attractive, but it also defines justice as a luxury good, that is 
outside the means of most people. It is an extremely unrealistic view, if justice should 
also be a more or less free service for all citizens in all their conflicts.  
One insight from Prahalad and Hart’s principles is that justice may be standardized, 
just  like  many  other  services,  making  use  of  economies  of  scale.  Modern 
technologies,  such  as  internet  and  mobile  phones,  make  it  possible  to  develop 
programs and services for entire countries or regions. Delivering justice is similar to 
delivering credit. Personalized legal services should be possible, but as an add-on for 
the ones that want to pay for it. Just like in the credit-business. 
8.  Trust in the Market? 
Remember: the market already delivers most justice services by turn-over, by number 
of  interventions,  or  by  any  other  measure.  It  certainly  delivers  the  substitutes  for 
formal justice that develop spontaneously in refugee camps, villages, and settlements 
outside the major cities of the Third World. Governments and Courts all over the 
world better accept their limited role in the delivery of the interventions that make 
justice  real.  They  could  do  a  better  job  by  developing  their  monitoring  and 
supervisory  role,  which is  essential.  Markets  cannot  be  trusted  if  they  are  left  by   27 
themselves. Markets need rules of the game and supervision. Only then suppliers on 
the market can earn the trust of the users of their services.  
9.  What Can the Market Deliver? 
We will not know the answer to that unless we have tried it. It seems unlikely that the 
provision of justice services should follow a completely different trajectory from all 
other products and services. Usually, they follow a path of competition, innovation, 
and attracting more and more clients, creating access to the service for these people. 
But  this  is  a  complicated  market,  which  has  not  yet  been  thoroughly  analyzed. 
Moreover, some government intervention is necessary. Cooperation between market 
and government, however, needs to be optimized, supported by research institutions 
and others who can fuel the innovation process.    
A problem may be that neutral legal services have a network character. They work 
better if more people use the system, but this requires an initial high investment.  
What we can also predict, however, is that it will be most difficult to reach the poorest 
of the poor. The bottom of the pyramid is very broad. There, millions of people need 
access to justice. They do have a limited purchasing power and can also invest time, if 
the services fit their needs and are understandable to them. Economies of scale can be 
reached. The poorest of the poor may still depend on subsidized legal services due to 
more complicated problem,s/issues and much more limited resources. Entrepreneurs 
working for profit will not see this as the biggest of opportunities. However, paying 
for legal aid for 5% of the population in order to help them through a system that is 
accessible for a low fee  is different than proposing to help 50% of the population to 
cope with a slow and complicated system designed for realities with much higher 
income levels. Therefore, humanitarian aid agencies will still have a role to play, but 
probably for a more focused group of people.     
10.  Justice is a Matter for the State! 
As we have shown in Section II.C, the role of the market, measured by numbers of 
clients served and by annual-turnover, is already much larger than the role of the State 
in meeting legal needs . There is no element of the norms and interventions of the 
justice system that can only be provided by the States. Sometimes state institutions 
have a comparative advantage in organizing the type of services that meet legal needs, 
sometimes market parties. The challenge is to let the State and the market cooperate 
in an optimal manner, looking at all incentives by all relevant participants. 
11.  What Can Donors Do?  
The principles of Prahalad applied to the justice sector thus change the approach of 
donor  interventions  as  well.  Traditional  models  of  providing  access  to  rights  in  a 
development  context  are  based  on  a  major  donor  support  of  legal  aid  programs, 
starting on a pilot scale. Efforts attempting to make legal aid structural (covering the 
country and providing structural legal solutions) and sustainable (permanent) often 
fail.  
As  we  have  seen,  these  models  sometimes  use  conditions  on  which  Microjustice 
differs. For instance, some donors forbid contributions by users, or they require that 
services are bought from preferred partners, such as law firms and legal experts from 
donor countries. Instead, Microjustice programs by donors will concentrate on trying   28 
to establish justice with minor investments, using less-skilled (inexpensive) labor, and 
providing paid legal services. In this way aid in the area of access to justice can lead 
to structural and sustainable improvements, because locals can make a living from the 
services.  Donor’s  funding  may  be  helpful  for  the  development  phase,  the  product 
identification,  the  general  program  costs  (updating  the  website,  research, 
documentaries etc), and for field-work in post-conflict zones where sustainability may 
still  be  difficult  or  impossible  to  achieve.  Ideally,  in  the  long  term,  the  general 
program costs should also be covered by the clients. If that is not possible, the sources 
of funding should be made permanent. Justice should be there to stay.  
B.  Conclusions 
Like microcredit, Microjustice can become a new way to deliver services that have 
traditionally existed. The needs of the clients, and their capacities, are the starting 
point for the development process. Then the existing services need to be analyzed 
thoroughly, in order to rediscover what is essential and what is a specific way to do 
things that has become the rule in more developed and richer markets. Similar to the 
way the credit business found new ground in the microcredit concepts, justice too can 
find  new  ground  in  innovative  forms  of  legal  services.  What  the  world  needs  in 
particular  are  new  forms  of  delivery  of  neutral  interventions,  by  trustworthy,  and 
independent decision makers, who have the necessary incentives to be transparent, 
induce  cooperation  between  their  clients,  and  serve  clients  at  the  low  end  of  the 
market. Their solutions to legal needs should be locally applicable (to the specific 
realities) and be informed by the best, most current, available know how.       
Legal services firms, legal expense insurers, banks, or any other organization offering 
commercial services may find it interesting to consider the development of innovative 
services in the spirit of Microjustice. Governments and donors may find it helpful to 
think about access to justice programs in terms of creating a climate for innovation 
and for legal services providers who deliver justice for profit at the bottom of the 
pyramid. Moreover, governments should be open to cooperation with providers of 
Microjustice, because they provide essential parts of the supply chain of justice.  
Accesible  legal  services  fulfilling  the  legal  needs  of  those  at  the  bottom  of  the 
pyramid provide an entire new perspective on the justice sector.  It could offer an 
instrument for the legal empowerment of the poor in a fruitful cooperation between 
the public and private sector. The challenge is huge and there will be problems along 
the way. However, a long journey starts with a first step.    29 
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